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INTRODUCTION 
The timing of the Boston University Law Review symposium, “The Most 
Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the 21st Century,” could not have 
been better.  Occurring, as it did, in the immediate aftermath of the historic 
2008 presidential election, the symposium followed an event that 
overshadowed the newly-elected Democratic Congress, threatening to push 
Congress back to the margins of constitutional commentary and to prevent it 
from escaping its status as the most disparaged branch of the federal 
government.  Our panel’s discussion of whether Congress is capable of 
conscientious, responsible constitutional interpretation provides the possibility 
of a long overdue rehabilitation of our understanding of congressional 
constitutional interpretation.  If the panel’s answers can show that Congress is 
actually capable of such constitutional interpretation then we will have gone a 
long way toward ameliorating, or perhaps undoing, the propensity of scholars 
and others to disparage Congress as a constitutional actor unworthy of respect 
or parity with the other branches of the federal government. 
This Essay suggests that while the purpose of our panel is laudable, it is 
ultimately misguided.  First, I suggest that we are being asked the wrong 
question.  The proper question is not whether Congress is capable of 
conscientious, responsible constitutional interpretation but rather how the 
institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution compares with 
that of the other two federal branches.  Second, I suggest that a debate that took 
place more than two decades ago on this question provides a useful starting 
point for contemporary analysis of the comparative institutional capacity of 
Congress to interpret the Constitution.  Third, I suggest the research necessary 
to construct a sound, positive account of Congress’s relative capacity to 
interpret the Constitution.  While these first three points are descriptive, I 
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conclude with a brief normative standard for evaluating the quality of 
congressional constitutional interpretation.  My positive account of Congress’s 
capacity for constitutional interpretation has normative consequences; it rules 
out certain ideals and possibilities.  With these consequences in mind,  I 
suggest the same standard as the one James Bradley Thayer proposed more 
than a century ago: reasonableness.1  We simply should ask what would be 
reasonable to expect from Congress in the field of constitutional interpretation.  
My tentative answer, which might sound to some people worse than intended, 
is that it should not be the same outcome as what we would expect from either 
the President or the federal judiciary.  Congress is a different institution and, of 
course, a legislative one at that.  Thus, we cannot expect Congress to function 
in the same manner as the other federal branches.  We need to formulate 
reasonable expectations for a legislative body as large and as constitutionally 
and historically constructed as Congress.  Thus the most important 
consideration is not whether, according to some abstract analysis or standard, 
Congress is a conscientious, responsible interpreter of the Constitution.  What 
should matter is not trying to make Congress into something it is not nor can 
ever be, but rather improving our understanding of how Congress actually 
performs its constitutional functions and how to improve that functioning. 
I. THE RIGHT QUESTION 
The launching pad for our discussion – and for the question of whether 
Congress is a conscientious interpreter of the Constitution – is James Bradley 
Thayer’s seminal 1893 article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine 
of Constitutional Law.2  In that article, Thayer makes two important claims 
about congressional constitutional interpretation.  First, he maintains that, 
among the three branches of the federal government, Congress is the principal 
interpreter of the Constitution.3  Second, Thayer claims that Congress has the 
institutional capacity to engage in conscientious constitutional interpretation.4  
But, as I believe Thayer recognized, these claims are not necessarily connected 
or interdependent.  It is possible for a public actor to have principal authority to 
interpret the Constitution but still be prone to mistakes or to doing a less than 
perfect job of it.  It is also possible for a public actor to have some authority, 
but not the principal authority, to interpret the Constitution but nevertheless 
have the institutional capacity to do a perfectly good, or quite respectable, job 
of it. 
The fact that I do not find Thayer’s two basic claims to be interdependent 
 
1 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 148 (1893). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 136 (“[I]t is the legislature to whom this power is given, – this power, not merely 
of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the constitution which shall deeply 
affect the whole country . . . .”). 
4 Id.  
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(or for one to follow logically or inexorably from the other) leads me to think 
that we ought to be answering a different question of principal concern in 
Thayer’s article: the question of Congress’s relative capacity to interpret the 
Constitution.  The principal matter of concern to Thayer – and particularly to 
me – is not whether Congress is capable of conscientious constitutional 
interpretation.  That is a normative question, and I am agnostic at least for 
present purposes on the appropriate standard for measuring the quality of 
Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution.  The critical question is a 
descriptive one – namely, how does Congress’s capacity to interpret the 
Constitution compare to that of either the presidency or the federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court.  Thayer’s answer was that Congress did no 
worse a job than that of the Court.5  Hence, he suggested, based on this 
descriptive account and the fact that members of Congress, unlike federal 
judges, are politically accountable, the normative proposition that the Court 
should defer to any congressional constitutional interpretations that were 
reasonable.6 
In other works, I have suggested that the Supreme Court is not necessarily 
supreme within the whole domain of constitutional interpretation and that 
Congress has at least as important a role in interpreting the Constitution.7  In 
the next two Parts of this Essay, I suggest that while there is good reason to 
believe Thayer correctly claimed that Congress has the institutional capacity to 
undertake conscientious constitutional interpretation, we remain relatively 
ignorant about the relative ability, or quality, of congressional constitutional 
interpretation. 
II. THE DEBATE: A QUARTER-CENTURY LATER 
While Thayer was among the first scholars to seriously consider Congress’s 
comparative ability to interpret the Constitution, he has not been the last.  In 
fact, the timing of this symposium on Congress as the most disparaged branch 
coincides with the twenty-fifth anniversary of a debate waged in the pages of 
the North Carolina Law Review over the question of Congress’s institutional 
capacity to interpret the Constitution.  On one side of the debate was Judge 
Abner Mikva, who harshly criticized Congress’s institutional capacity for 
conscientious constitutional interpretation.8  Mikva’s critique surprised many 
 
5 Id. at 148 (describing the judicial function as “merely that of fixing the outside border 
of reasonable legislative action,” thereby complementing Congress’s role as the primary 
constitutional interpreter). 
6 Id. at 144 (pointing to the judicial standard of review in upholding rational 
congressional actions). 
7 Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 715 (2008) 
[hereinafter Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent] (arguing that precedents created by non-
judicial actors are often stronger than those produced by courts). 
8 Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 
N.C. L. REV. 587, 590 (1983). 
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people because he had been a well-respected member of the House of 
Representatives before his appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.  Nevertheless, Mikva, citing three examples of 
constitutional deliberation, argued that constitutional interpretation by 
members of Congress was suspect, and often poor, because Congress was not 
structured to allow for conscientious constitutional interpretation, and because 
most members of Congress were not lawyers, did not have the time or interest 
to delve deeply into the constitutional questions before them, and were forced, 
for one reason or another, to rely on their staffs (or other congressional 
members) for assistance in constitutional interpretation.9 
Two years later, Lou Fisher, a well-respected separation-of-powers 
specialist with the Congressional Research Service, published a response to 
Mikva.10  Fisher argued that congressional constitutional interpretation was not 
only better than Mikva had suggested, but in fact was relatively good because 
members of Congress often seriously engaged with constitutional issues and 
received excellent institutional support on constitutional matters from their 
professional staffs (including many lawyers) as well as from the Congressional 
Research Service, committee staffs, expert witnesses, and the Offices of the 
Legislative Counsel of both the House and the Senate.11 
Interestingly, legal scholars have paid scant attention to the Mikva-Fisher 
debate.  In the twenty-five subsequent years, academic commentaries on 
congressional constitutional interpretation have rarely referenced the debate, 
much less discussed it at any length.  This is a shame since the subject of 
congressional constitutional interpretation has hardly gone away in the 
intervening years.  Indeed, congressional constitutional interpretation has only 
grown in importance, and Mikva’s and Fisher’s arguments still resonate with 
both critics and defenders of Congress’s institutional capacity to interpret the 
Constitution.  Perhaps what is less appreciated is that their debate reflects the 
ongoing problems with commentaries on congressional constitutional 
interpretation, problems that we need to overcome if we are to better 
understand the relative capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution.  It 
turns out that the arguments made by both Mikva and Fisher are still 
illuminating but are not without problems. 
For instance, Mikva’s comments were based on anecdotal, not empirical, 
evidence.12  His three examples can raise, but not settle, questions about 
 
9 Id. at 609 (“Both institutionally and politically, Congress is designed to pass over the 
constitutional questions, leaving the hard decisions to the courts.”). 
10 Lou Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 
707 (1985). 
11 Id. at 727-31. 
12 See Mikva, supra note 8, at 590 (describing three examples of congressional 
deliberation on constitutional matters including Congress’s consideration of the Fair Labor 
Standards Amendment of 1974, the Senate’s deliberation of a legislative veto provision to 
the Administrative Procedure Act, and congressional discussion of appellate review in the 
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Congress’s institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution.  Moreover, 
Mikva might not have been a completely dispassionate analyst.  As a sitting 
judge at the time he wrote his commentary, Mikva conceivably had a vested 
interest in reaching the conclusion he did – namely, that federal judges (like 
himself) should not defer to interpretations of the Constitution by Congress but 
instead should reach independent interpretations of the pertinent constitutional 
issues.  Mikva was a distinguished public servant, excellent judge, and brilliant 
lawyer, but his critique of Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution is 
prone to being dismissed as too self-interested. 
There are arguably similar problems with Fisher’s response.13  First, the fact 
that there are resources available to assist members of Congress with 
constitutional interpretation does not tell us anything about the relative quality 
of those resources or the interpretations based on their use.  It is possible that 
these resources are not as good as Fisher suggests.  Moreover, we have little or 
no idea of how often members (as opposed to their staffs) actually avail 
themselves of these resources, and we particularly lack an understanding of 
their impact on congressional constitutional interpretation.  Second, Fisher’s 
analysis, like that of Mikva’s, might be too self-interested to warrant 
confidence.  After all, Fisher was defending the very institution of which he 
was – and remains – a vital part.  Third, Fisher’s analysis could have benefitted 
from more empirical analysis.  Indeed, one important question raised by the 
Mikva-Fisher debate is what kind of data would help us to better understand 
and to evaluate the institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the 
Constitution.14  Merely describing the resources available to assist with 
congressional constitutional interpretation does not tell us much about either 
how such interpretation compares with that of the other branches or why courts 
should defer to it. 
The former of these two questions is the descriptive question of principal 
concern to me in this Essay.  It requires a sounder, positive account of the 
relative institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution.  Such 
an account requires more information than we have at present on congressional 
constitutional interpretation.  Thus, in the next Part I consider the other 
information necessary to better understand and evaluate the relative 
institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution. 
III. WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW 
While legal scholars over the past twenty-five years have not done as much 
as they could to update the Mikva-Fisher debate, they have not been 
completely unproductive, and we have learned a few things about Congress’s 
capacity to interpret the Constitution.  In this Part, I briefly consider the state 
 
1970 Organized Crime Control Act). 
13 I hasten to add that Lou Fisher is a friend of mine and a first-rate constitutional 
analyst. 
14 See Fisher, supra note 10, at 708; Mikva, supra note 8, at 590. 
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of our knowledge – and particularly what more we need to know – of the 
institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the Constitution. 
The first thing to acknowledge is that since the publication of Lou Fisher’s 
1985 response to Judge Mikva the world of constitutional law and Congress’s 
role within it have not remained static.  Indeed, the past twenty-five years have 
featured as much constitutional activity in Congress as there has been during 
any other comparable period of time.  I need not provide a comprehensive 
recounting of all those activities here, but even a small sampling reveals the 
breadth and depth of congressional constitutional activity: the impeachment 
and removals of three federal district judges in the late 1980s;15 the contentious 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Robert Bork in 198716 and Clarence 
Thomas in 1991;17 the appointment of Chief Justices of the United States in 
198618 and again in 2005;19 congressional decision-making during the 1990s 
regarding unfunded mandates, major health care and welfare reform, and the 
impeachment and trial of President William Jefferson Clinton;20 Congress’s 
responses to the President’s increasing use of signing statements;21 and 
Congress’s response to the worst down-turn in the economy since the Great 
Depression.22  Moreover, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the 
United States provoked numerous responses from Congress, including, inter 
alia, the following: debating and issuing a joint resolution supporting the 
President’s use of military force in both Afghanistan and Iraq;23 the funding of 
military invasions of (and operations within) those two countries;24 enactment 
of the PATRIOT Act;25 legislation restricting habeas corpus and otherwise 
governing the conditions and interrogations of people captured and held in 
detention as a result of the terrorist attacks;26 and the strident debates within 
 
15 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 37, 40 (2d ed. 2000). 
16 See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1987). 
17 See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1991). 
18 Editorial, The Hearings on Justice Rehnquist, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1986, at 14. 
19 Todd S. Purdum & Robin Toner, Roberts Hearing Reveals Divisions, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 14, 2005, at 7. 
20 See GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 177-94. 
21 Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2006, S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006). 
22 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009). 
23 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
24 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 6, 121 Stat. 1844, 
2446-56 (2007). 
25 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).   
26 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2006 (2006) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w and scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), 
invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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the Senate over the constitutionality of the filibuster from 2003 to 2005.27  This 
litany of examples ought to be a dramatic reminder of the extent to which 
Congress renders constitutional judgments.28 
While this extensive activity does not tell us much, if anything, about the 
relative quality of congressional constitutional interpretation, its enormous 
variety is itself significant.  The sheer extent of the constitutional judgments 
that are made in Congress in enacting legislation – far more extensive in a 
given year compared to the Supreme Court in deciding cases – suggests that 
Congress does have the institutional capacity to make these judgments.29  
Moreover, these activities provide legal scholars and others with ample 
opportunities to study the institutional capacity of Congress to interpret the 
Constitution.  Somehow Congress manages to produce such judgments.  These 
activities are, in other words, the very things we need to study if we are 
interested in refining our understanding of the institutional capacity of 
Congress to interpret the Constitution. 
A second thing we probably understand better today than we might have 
twenty-five years ago is the ramifications of viewing Congress as either an “it” 
or a “they.”  Just as the Court should be considered a “they” and not an “it,”30 
we may consider Congress to be a “they” and not an “it.”  If we think of 
Congress as a group of people – 425 in the House of Representatives and 100 
in the Senate – then the complexity of what Congress is and what Congress 
does becomes more apparent.  From such a perspective, congressional 
decisions, even those involving constitutional interpretations, could not be 
sensibly likened to those of a single, rational individual.  Group decision-
making is likely to produce outcomes that are hard to reconcile and may reflect 
compromises among people whose preferences are bound to vary in terms of 
intensity and priority.31  Moreover, thinking of Congress as a “they” would 
attach more significance to the process through which decisions are reached 
and thus is likely to emphasize the importance of the acts of particular 
 
27 David D. Kirkpatrick, Deal Draws Criticism from Left and Right, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2005, at A18. 
28 For a discussion of these and other examples of non-judicial precedents, see Gerhardt, 
Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 7, at 738-40, 745-53 (cataloging the various ways that 
institutions create precedents). 
29 See id. at 736-45 (chronicling the various ways Congress makes constitutional 
decisions); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 985-87 (2005) [hereinafter Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency] 
(explaining how scholars should understand a more nuanced and moderate view of 
precedent in constitutional law). 
30 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory 
and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 549, 550 (2005) (arguing that analytical 
problems arise by viewing the judiciary as a single entity rather than a collective body). 
31 See Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency, supra note 29, at 955-57 (using rational 
choice theory to explain how Presidents’ efforts to influence Court decision-making are 
rarely effective). 
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individuals – for example, committee chairs who wield inordinate influence in 
scheduling committee hearings and votes, or members who might exhibit 
either relative ignorance of various issues being discussed or a relative lack of 
engagement, preparation, or attendance. 
But shifting the perspective, as per Mark Tushnet’s suggestion on the day 
our panel met, to viewing Congress as an “it” can be equally if not more 
useful.32  To begin with, the quality of any particular individual’s performance 
becomes irrelevant.  If we understand the House and Senate each as 
institutions, rather than as groups of people, then it does not matter whether 
some, most, or all members are unprepared or ignorant in the context of 
constitutional analysis.  Instead, what matters is what it does as well as what 
are its rules, standard procedures, formal resources, and outputs.  If we know 
these rules and other features of Congress, we can develop an understanding of 
how the institution operates.  Indeed, viewing Congress as an “it” helps 
illuminate the prerequisites that must be met in order for certain actions to take 
place.  What particular individuals do matters less than the nature of the rules 
and procedures for decision-making and whether, or to what extent, they have 
been followed.  Both the reasons for the rules and the consequences of 
complying with them are what count.  Thus, if we think of Congress as an “it” 
and not a “they,” one does not have to worry about whether Senator Arlen 
Specter voted for a particular bill because he thought the courts might strike it 
down,33 or whether Senator Ted Stevens did not base his votes to remove three 
judges in the 1980s on his own study of the pertinent records but rather on his 
preference simply to follow the leads of several other senators whose views he 
respected or chose to emulate.34 
The utility and pertinence of the information that we gather to analyze 
congressional constitutional interpretation depends largely on the perspective 
of the analyst.  For instance, assume a scholar argues that Congress’s capacity 
to interpret the Constitution is not what it used to be and bases his assertion on 
the fact that more members of Congress in the past did their own work (and 
wrote their own speeches) than do today.  This assumption might well be valid, 
but it is of limited relevance.  True, it tells us something about the relative 
quality of certain individual performances within the Congress, but given that 
 
32 Viewing Congress as an “it” for the purpose of constitutional analysis helps explain 
why congressional actions in the aggregate demonstrate actions seemingly lacking in 
consideration of the Constitution’s restraints.  See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG 
RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 118 (2008). 
33 See Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the 
Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 499 (2009). 
34 This reference to Senator Stevens is based on a survey I conducted as a special 
consultant for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.  Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Senate’s Process for Removing Federal Judges, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS OF 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 139 (1993) (summarizing 
the results of a comprehensive questionnaire completed by twenty-one senators). 
  
2009] JUDGING CONGRESS 533 
 
the workload of members of Congress has exponentially increased over the last 
160 years, none of us should be surprised to find that at least some, if not most, 
members of Congress rely on their staffs and other resources more than they 
used to.  Indeed, the increased workload helps to explain why these resources 
exist.  From the institutional perspective (i.e., the perspective of Congress as an 
“it”), we are no longer interested in individual performance or motivation but 
rather the basic patterns of what Congress does (and does not do) over time.  
This includes but is not limited to the levels of participation in committee and 
floor debates, the numbers of speeches addressing or making constitutional 
points, the responsibilities of committee and other staffs in the House and the 
Senate, the productivity of committees including its outputs, and the number of 
laws – and other matters – on which each chamber of Congress acts as a whole 
during a given session.  These patterns are objective data on congressional 
constitutional activity. 
The persistent disparagement of Congress derives in part from not just how 
analysts perceive Congress but also how they perceive the other branches of 
the federal government.  It is possible that some people look down on 
Congress because they are looking at it from the perspective of another branch, 
which might well be inclined, for its own self-serving reasons, to look down on 
the other branches.  It is also possible that opinions of the institutional 
capacities of the different branches might depend not just on analysts’ 
experiences (i.e., for whom they have worked), but also their ambitions (i.e., 
whose favor they would like to curry or for which branch they would like to 
work).  Understanding Congress requires, in other words, appreciating the 
nature and ramifications of our own biases, preferences, and experiences. 
A third thing we know we need to do in order to fully appreciate Congress’s 
institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution is not to overstate the 
significance of the phenomenon that Professor Tushnet describes as “judicial 
overhang.”35  It is important to appreciate that relatively little of the realm of 
constitutional activity in Congress is actually subjected to judicial review, and 
the relatively little that is subjected to judicial review is usually upheld.36  
Among the more notable congressional decisions that have usually not been 
subject to judicial review are oversight, funding, impeachments, removals and 
convictions, expulsions, rule-making within the House and the Senate, treaty 
ratifications, and nominations.37  Judicial overhang is not, nor ever has been, 
pertinent to any of these areas of political and constitutional decision-making.  
Nor do I expect it to be. 
But, there is more.  The political salience of different subjects is likely to 
 
35 See Tushnet, supra note 33, at 504 (describing the idea that Congress will engage in 
scant constitutional interpretation because of the belief that the courts are in place to correct 
any errors). 
36 See Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 7, at 745-52 (arguing that there are 
various mechanisms at work that limit the scope of constitutional review in the courts). 
37 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
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make a difference in congressional performance, though the precise difference 
is not so clear.  On the one hand, the prospect of extensive public scrutiny is 
likely to focus the attention of members of Congress.  Members of Congress 
are likely to pay more attention to highly politically salient matters, such as 
presidential impeachments.  It is reasonable to assume that members of 
Congress will work hard on matters on which they believe the public is 
watching.  Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that members of 
Congress will pay less attention to matters they believe will make little or no 
difference to their re-elections.  Such was the case, for instance, in several 
Senate impeachment trials of the 1930s, in which attendance was extremely 
poor because senators did not think the trials were pertinent to their re-
elections.38  Consequently, the Senate amended its standing rules to create a 
special impeachment trial committee consisting of twelve senators who would 
be responsible for gathering evidence, taking testimony, and writing a report 
for their colleagues.39  The Senate invoked this rule in each of the three 
removal trials it was obliged to hold during the 1980s, but it chose not to 
invoke the rule in President Clinton’s trial because senators perceived that their 
constituents wanted them to personally participate in a trial with the potential 
to oust a President of the United States.40 
On the other hand, the fact that an issue lacks political salience does not 
necessarily mean that members of Congress will simply check out or ignore it 
altogether.  There are some issues – trademarks and copyrights for instance – 
on which some members of Congress might have special expertise to which 
their colleagues might defer.  Moreover, the absence of a spotlight might 
actually lead some members of Congress to pay more attention to the actual 
merits of an issue and less attention to the political ramifications.  Indeed, 
some issues might not be politically salient to a wide constituency but rather to 
particular segments or sections of the country.  For instance, the subject of 
alternative fuels might not be of interest to voters in some parts of the country 
but it might be a serious concern to voters in other parts of the country.41  The 
point is that judicial overhang might simply be one of many factors that might 
enter into the calculus of members of Congress and sometimes it might be 
overshadowed or displaced by other factors.  Hence, it is important to verify 
how much and in what specific ways judicial overhang affects the capacity of 
Congress to interpret the Constitution.  The suggestion that judicial overhang 
might be a disincentive for some members of Congress to become more 
 
38 See GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 37-39 (discussing Senators’ “general lack of interest” 
in impeachment proceedings and citing as an example the 1933 impeachment trial of Judge 
Louderback where only three senators were present). 
39 COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN 
THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS, S. DOC. NO. 110-6, at 210 (2007). 
40 GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 180-85. 
41 For example, voters in Iowa may be particularly interested in legislation related to 
fuels developed from corn. 
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engaged is not a fact but an assumption that sorely needs testing. 
Moreover, it is an unproven assumption that members of Congress will 
naturally or necessarily defer to courts on questions of constitutional law.  It is 
possible that members of Congress will defer when they agree with (or are 
indifferent to) what the courts rule.  But, there is a long history of members of 
Congress vigorously defending their entitlement to have an independent say 
about what the Constitution means.  Indeed, it is not hard to find examples of 
Congress deciding to take certain actions – such as enacting legislative vetoes42 
and criminalizing flag burning43 or partial-birth abortions44 – that appear to be 
flatly inconsistent with judicial rulings.  Such examples ought to lead us to 
examine more systematically how often Congress acts contrary to the Court 
and does not just side-step or act with apparent indifference to the prospect of 
judicial review. 
IV. EVALUATING CONGRESS 
In this final Part, I briefly consider the normative question of how to 
evaluate congressional constitutional interpretation.  The short answer is that it 
depends on whether one views Congress as a “they” or an “it.”  If, for instance, 
we think of Congress as a “they,” then we could ask six questions.  First, we 
could ask about the relative quality of the constitutional decision-making of the 
members of Congress.  To answer this question, we need to consider the skills 
required to do good or excellent work in Congress.  Presumably, these include, 
inter alia, drafting statutes, speech-writing, building coalitions to forge 
legislative majorities, delivering goods and services to their constituents or 
states, hiring good staff, and knowledge of, or expertise in, constitutional law 
and the rules, procedures, and history of Congress.  For each of these skills, we 
can develop standards and then assess how well each member of Congress 
measures up to these standards. 
Second, we could ask how well members of Congress fulfill their duties as 
representatives.  Generally, these duties may be acting as agents to implement 
the wishes of their constituents, to reflect the diverse interests of their districts 
or states, and to act in the best interests of their constituents.  One could then 
assess how well each representative or senator performs one, or all, of these 
functions. 
Third, we could follow David Mayhew’s lead in evaluating the leadership of 
members of Congress in affecting the public sphere.45  Like Mayhew did, we 
 
42 See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest 
Proposal – Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115 (1996) (demonstrating that legislative 
vetoes remain a widely adopted legislative tool despite contrary Supreme Court decisions). 
43 See Eichman v. United States, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (striking down a federal flag 
desecration statute nearly identical to a state statute previously struck down by the Court). 
44 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) (upholding the federal partial-
birth abortion ban nearly identical to a state statute struck down by the Court). 
45 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS 1-6 (2000) (chronicling the 
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could examine how often each member of Congress has attempted to take 
affirmative leadership in Congress, and whether it has been to propose or push 
legislation or to advance or support some other congressional initiative.46  
Once we calculated these numbers, then we could ask how many times the 
House or Senate followed the member’s lead.  This would give us some idea of 
a particular member’s relative effectiveness as a leader in Congress. 
Fourth, we could ask about the role of congressional stare decisis.  In 
particular, we could ask to what extent members of Congress follow prior 
congressional constitutional interpretations and/or their own prior 
constitutional decisions.  This question is directed at uncovering data on the 
fidelity of each member of Congress to prior constitutional decisions.  It is also 
directed at assessing the path dependency of such decisions, i.e., the extent to 
which they constrain a member’s subsequent decision-making.47  Similarly, we 
could ask about the extent to which members followed judicial precedent. 
Fifth, we could assess how well each member of Congress employs the 
different modes of constitutional analysis.  This would require gathering all the 
public statements of members of Congress and analyzing the quality of 
constitutional analysis in each.  This might also entail asking whether a 
member got a particular constitutional question right. 
Last but not least, we could ask what kinds of support or assistance 
members of Congress need to improve their constitutional interpretation.  Of 
course, the answer depends in part on the relative quality of the resources 
currently available to assist constitutional interpretation and of the 
constitutional interpretation itself.  It also depends on the criteria we use to 
evaluate the quality of these two things. 
If, however, we viewed Congress as an “it,” we would ask some of the same 
as well as some different questions.  The first is what would be a reasonable 
expectation to have about Congress as a legislative body.  It is not reasonable 
to expect Congress, at least at the institutional level, to act like either the 
judicial or executive branches.  But the question remains what should we 
expect from Congress as an institution charged with various constitutional 
authorities and responsibilities?  One possibility is to examine how one 
Congress measures against another Congress, while another possibility is to 
develop, as I suggested above, a positive account of how Congress actually 
makes constitutional decisions.  In developing this account, we should 
 
contributions of various important congressional members throughout history and 
introducing a means for examining public opinions as affected by individual congressional 
member action). 
46 Id. at 168-75 (introducing an analysis of “action patterns” in the careers of members of 
Congress and noting that relatively few individual congressional members have careers 
involving spearheading multiple major congressional actions). 
47 On the limited path dependency of judicial and non-judicial precedents, see Gerhardt, 
Non-Judicial Precedent, supra note 7, at 784 (“Shifting perspective from judicial to non-
judicial precedent illuminates that the Court is supreme within a much narrower realm than 
that in which non-judicial precedents are made.”). 
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distinguish between the interpretation of the Constitution (i.e., the role of the 
judiciary in answering questions about constitutional meaning) and 
constitutional construction (i.e., the culmination, or consequences, of 
congressional efforts to implement constitutional ideals or values).  The quest 
to illuminate Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution neglects to take 
into account the fact that the notion of constitutional construction better 
captures the essence of what Congress is doing when it is addressing or 
confronting questions of constitutional meaning.  While constitutional 
construction is infused with politics, this does not mean that it is irrelevant to 
the development of constitutional practices and understanding over time.  As 
Keith Whittington suggests: 
Political practice helps define what we understand the Constitution to 
mean, but it does not arise through anything like interpretive argument 
and does not exist in the form of constitutional law.  The idea of 
construction helps us understand how constitutional meaning is 
elaborated even when government officials do not seem to be talking 
about the Constitution, or are not saying anything at all.48 
He explains further that the “defining features of constitutional constructions 
are that they resolve textual indeterminacies and that they address 
constitutional subject matter.  Thus, some political debates are properly 
characterized as constitutional even if explicit references to the terms of a 
specific written constitution are rare or nonexistent.”49  The point is that the 
constitutionally-significant activity in Congress looks and sounds different 
than it does in the courts.  We should not only factor these differences into our 
understanding and appraisal of Congress but also recognize that constitutional 
construction itself needs to be the focus of our inquiry. 
Next, we could ask about the extent to which Congress acts in accordance 
with, or independent from, the Supreme Court.  This is a question not just 
about whether Congress demonstrates fidelity to Supreme Court decisions but 
also whether, or to what extent, constitutional history matters to Congress.  
This requires in turn that we examine the extent to which Congress produces or 
follows constitutional history (and what it considers, or takes into account, as 
such).  Moreover, we could ask whether Congress has developed the capacity 
to follow constitutional law.  Of course, this question requires that we clarify 
what we mean by constitutional law.  It is commonplace to equate 
constitutional law with the decisions of the Supreme Court, but one thing to 
consider is what Congress treats as constitutional law. 
Finally, we could ask the same question for Congress as an “it” as we do for 
the members of Congress as a “they” – did Congress get it right?  In some 
ways, this is both the easiest and hardest question.  It is the easiest because 
asking it does not require any knowledge of Congress.  It is also easy because 
 
48 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 7 (1999). 
49 Id. at 9. 
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an analyst might presumably use whatever he or she thinks is the proper test 
for determining the right outcomes of constitutional questions.  Yet, the history 
of constitutional theory teaches us nothing if it fails to teach us that every 
theory of constitutional law is imperfect.  The question is either which is the 
least imperfect or which of the imperfect theories of constitutional law should 
be used and why.  Luckily for me, I need not answer that question because it is 
well beyond the scope of this symposium. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of the relative institutional capacity of Congress to interpret 
the Constitution turns on many factors.  It depends on, inter alia, whether we 
conceive of Congress as either a “they” or an “it,” as having the same or 
different capacity for constitutional interpretation than the other branches, as 
performing particular functions of representation, as making the correct 
constitutional decisions, as engaging with the different modes of constitutional 
argumentation, as developing or utilizing the appropriate resources to assist 
with conscientious constitutional argumentation, as being faithful to or 
independent from the Court, and as acting consistently with its rules, 
procedures, traditions, and prior constitutional decision-making. 
What we learn about Congress’s capacity to interpret the Constitution from 
the answers to these inquiries has tremendous ramifications for constitutional 
law.  It is important for raising (or perhaps maintaining lowered) respect for 
Congress as one of the three principal constitutional actors at the federal level.  
It is important to the perennially important question of how much deference 
does, or should, the courts give to congressional constitutional interpretation.  
Thayer’s answer was that the federal courts should defer to Congress a great 
deal.50  But his answer depended on a presumption, and not the fact that 
Congress is at least as good as the courts in interpreting the Constitution.51  
Moreover, Thayer’s answer did not depend on whether such deference was 
either compelled by, or consistent with, the Constitution itself.  The question of 
whether the Court should defer to congressional constitutional interpretation 
further depends on the Supreme Court’s own responsibilities and capacity to 
interpret the Constitution, neither of which are concerns of this symposium.  
Thus, the question of whether the Court should defer to congressional 
constitutional interpretation is not a question we can answer, since it depends 
on information we do not have and on matters beyond the scope of our 
immediate project.  Our immediate project is to compare the capacity of 
Congress to that of the other branches to interpret the Constitution.  This is, as 
I have said, an old question, but it says a lot more about the legal academy than 
Congress that it is a question that legal scholars have not yet answered. 
 
 
50 See Thayer, supra note 1, at 144. 
51 For a modern defense of this view, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF 
REASON 57-62 (2008). 
